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Abstract 
The UNFCCC Paris Agreement, entered into force on 4 November 2016, represents a step forward in involving all 
countries in mitigation actions, even though it is based on a voluntary approach and lacks the active participation 
of some major polluting countries. The underinvestment in mitigation actions depends on market and policy 
failures and the absence of price signals internalizing the economic losses due to climatic damage. This contributes 
to underestimating potential benefits from global action. In this paper we discuss how crucial is the assessment of 
the vulnerability of a country to climate change in defining the threat and action strategies. A dynamic climate-
economy CGE model is developed that includes a monetary evaluation of regional damages associated with climate 
change. By considering alternative damage profiles, results show that internalizing climatic costs might change the 
bargaining position of countries in climate negotiations. Consequently, damage costs should be given greater 
importance when defining the implementation of a global climate agreement. 
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1. Climate negotiations and damage costs 
The twenty-first Conference of the Parties (COP21) held in Paris in December 2015 under the United 
Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) succeeded in reaching the so-called Paris 
Agreement. Entered into force on 4th November 2016, it will be effective from 2020. In order to achieve 
the long-term goal of keeping the global temperature rise this century to well below 2 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels, all Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) 
as soon as possible. The voluntary approach and the absence of sanctions (Nordhaus, 2015), together 
with the great country heterogeneity (Brunnée and Streck, 2013; Costantini et al., 2016) make this 
agreement weak in achieving an inter-generational sustainability goal. Contributions to past GHG 
patterns reflecting development inequalities create additionally difficulties in designing a burden 
sharing that exhibits a globally equitable climate mitigation strategy (Matthews, 2016). Such difficulties 
will increase further if large emitters with historical responsibility do not participate, which is what is 
happening in the case of the U.S. after the declaration of President Trump in June 2017 to withdraw from 
the Paris climate accord. 
At the same time, the greater vulnerability to negative effects from climate change faced by poor 
countries is causing an increase in intra-generational inequity at the global level (Roson and van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2012). According to the outcome of the meeting in Cancun by the Global Platform for 
Disaster Risk Reduction, at least 87 countries should systematically account for environmental disaster 
losses by 2020, around 90% of which will result from climate change. A recent report by the World Bank 
(Hallegatte et al., 2016) provides a broad monetary quantification of the cost of inaction for the 
underdeveloped world that would force more than 100 million people into extreme poverty by 2030. 
The uneven distribution across countries of losses caused by climatic damage is strictly related to 
how vulnerable a country is to environmental factors. Vulnerability increases the likelihood of natural 
hazards turning into damages (or disasters). The magnitude of the effect depends in turn on how many 
people are exposed to the hazard and live in areas lacking prevention actions to reduce the impact on 
anthropogenic activities (Paul, 2011). Accordingly, expenditure to reduce such vulnerability – broadly 
known as adaptation – will be greater the larger is a country’s likelihood to experience frequent and 
strong natural hazards, as long as adequate economic resources are available (Neumayer et al., 2014). 
3 
While this reasoning can be fully applied to resilience and adaptation measures, the global public bad 
characteristic of climate change might lead to diverging positions for the polluter and the agent affected 
by the damage in the bargaining process of sharing mitigation costs. Thus, if countries responsible for a 
high share of GHG emissions do not correspond to those most vulnerable to climate change, their 
propensity to mitigate will decrease. Although this heterogeneous regional distribution of climatic 
damage and GHG emissions can be considered as a barrier to a global action, the internalization of 
damage costs into market mechanisms could help to reduce this gap and shape a different geography of 
climate political economy (Kelly and Adger, 2000; Moore and Diaz, 2015). 
Several attempts have been made to analyse the physical impacts of climate change and their 
monetary evaluation (Anderson, 2006; Arndt et al., 2015; Bosello et al., 2012b, EU, 2011; Fussel and 
Klein, 2006; Fussel, 2010). Better information on where climatic damages occur, combined with a 
credible quantification of its monetary costs should increase the likelihood of coalitions succeeding in 
the bargaining process, thus inducing larger coalitions to be more stable (Dellink et al., 2013; Méjean et 
al., 2015; Verendel et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, given the voluntarily approach characterizing the Paris Agreement, awareness of 
climatic damages can substantially influence the efforts of countries, especially developing ones, in 
climate actions.  Under the Paris framework, all countries are asked to submit their National Determined 
Contributions (NDCs), formal documents stating the efforts and the targets set by each country in order 
to contribute to the achievement of the final global goal, together with the means of implementation. So 
far, despite their poverty conditions, most developing countries have set mitigation actions to be 
implemented with national resources and with the international support.1 These actions are also 
planned by very poor and vulnerable countries, suffering from high climatic costs, as a consequence of 
the role that the cost of climate change is already playing in influencing bargaining positions. The more 
a country is aware of the costs induced by climate change, the more this is reflected in the contents of 
its NDC, with respect to mitigation and adaptation actions, requests for international support and access 
                                                 
1 Source: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx. 
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to resources from climate international financing mechanisms, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF).2 
This position is fully consistent with what Valentini and Vitale (2018) define as the choice of optimal 
climate policy in the case of a pessimistic social planner. In the case of low uncertainty on the large 
damages associated to climate change in one country, the policy maker will be favourable to early 
adoption of sharp and immediate mitigation efforts. Since NDCs must be revised every five years on the 
basis of national circumstances and priorities, both effective actions and future positions of developing 
countries in negotiations are likely to be strongly influenced by their exposure to climate change and by 
the awareness of climatic damages. 
The present paper attempts to evaluate to what extent the introduction of monetary costs of climatic 
damage into climate policy impact assessment might influence the relative attractiveness of potential 
mitigation actions debated under the Paris Agreement framework. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
existing contributions on monetary evaluation of climatic damage. Section 3 describes the long-term 
dynamic climate-economic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (GDynEP) used to internalize 
damage cost and evaluate abatement scenarios. Section 4 provides an interpretation of the results under 
the lens of a cost-benefit analysis approach, while Section 5 provides brief policy conclusions. 
 
2. Economic losses due to climatic damages 
Damage assessment is subject to large uncertainties with respect to: the definition of future emission 
paths, the related change in GHG concentration in the atmosphere, the effect on temperature increase 
and the effects of adaptation actions (Markandya, 2014). Furthermore, given that adaptation depends 
on the interactions between physical climate conditions and socio-economic systems, the climatic 
economic losses also depend on the projected future socio-economic scenarios. 
Applied energy and climate models have been used extensively to measure these economic losses 
(Markandya et al., 2017) but damage estimations are still quite heterogeneous. For a lower bound 
temperature increase (around 2-3°C) and a time horizon of 2050, costs range from a low loss of 0.3% of 
                                                 
2 The GCF, discussed and approved during the COP16 held in Cancun in 2010 and officially launched the following year at 
COP17, is explicitly individuated as a key mechanism for international support by several developing and emerging countries 
in their NDCs, such as China, Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, among the others. 
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world GDP (Mendelsohn et al., 1998) to a higher impact of 2% (OECD, 2015). Considering a temperature 
increase between 2.4°C and 5.5°C, the global loss is even greater, on average 3% of global GDP but with 
a range of 1.5%-6.1% (Dellink et al., 2014; Nordhaus, 2008, 2011, 2013; Roson and van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2012; Stern, 2007). Although most of the studies agree on the fact that developing 
countries will bear the highest costs (DARA, 2012a,b; Moore and Diaz, 2015), there is still no complete 
consensus about the amount and regional distribution of climatic costs. These differences in estimates 
arise from the heterogeneity of methods applied to calculate the costs (Tol, 2015) and are magnified by 
the several steps of the climate assessment. 
First, monetary evaluation of climate damages varies with the impacts covered (Dellink et al., 2014; 
Mendelsohn et al., 1998). While some studies only account for market impacts, which are those affecting 
agriculture, fisheries, tourism or energy sectors (Mendelsohn et al., 2006; OECD, 2015; Roson and 
Sartori, 2016), others include a wider range of components, considering also non-market impacts 
related to extreme events, loss of biodiversity or health effects (Bosello et al., 2009; DARA, 2012a,b; 
Dellink et al., 2014; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Stern, 2007). Estimates for the former are certainly more 
accurate as non-market impacts are less easily measurable.  But their inclusion results in higher overall 
estimates of climate costs especially for developing countries. Indeed, non-market costs can explain 
most of the discrepancies among existing studies (Stern, 2007). Furthermore, in most cases “loss 
estimates are lower bound estimates because many impacts, e.g. loss of human lives, cultural heritage, 
ecosystem services, are difficult to value and monetize, and thus they are poorly reflected in estimates 
of losses” (IPCC, 2012, p. 7). Accordingly, the inclusion of both market and non-market components is 
essential for a comprehensive climate cost measurement, notwithstanding the problems with non-
market estimation. 
To the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive study providing information on economic 
losses occurred due to climatic damage for a large sample of countries is the Second Climate 
Vulnerability Monitor developed by DARA (2012a,b), an independent organization commissioned by 
the Climate Vulnerable Forum to assess the human and the economic costs of the climate crisis in view 
of the 18th Conference of Parties. It provides measures of the climate damages effectively sustained by 
184 countries for a wide range of impacts summarized in 22 indicators, market and non-market based, 
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covering four different areas: environmental disasters, habitat change, health impact and industry 
stress.3 
A second issue is the definition of the damage function, linking damages in monetary terms to climate 
variables. Damages are mainly represented as a polynomial function (often quadratic) of either global 
mean temperature change (Bosetti et al., 2006a; Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013) or the rate and magnitude 
of temperature increase (Hope, 2010, 2011; Waldhoff et al., 2014). Economic damages can be expressed 
as a fraction of world output (Bosetti et al., 2006a; Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013) or, according to the 
willingness-to-accept (WTA) approach (Bosello and De Cian, 2014), in terms of the maximum price a 
consumer is willing to pay to avoid a temperature rise. This is usually the basis for monetizing non-
market impacts and represents, at the regional level, the monetary national consumption and income 
reduction due to climate change. An evolution of the WTA approach is referred to as the Social Cost of 
Carbon (SCC) (van den Bergh and Botzen, 2015). Higher GHG concentrations give rise to temperature 
increase, precipitation variability and raised frequency of extreme events that in turn might result in 
damages (or disasters) to various sectors of the economy according to the relative vulnerability of a 
country to natural hazards. Given that emissions of GHG have the same effect on concentrations 
irrespective of wherever they are emitted, it is possible to consider the SCC as the global average damage 
due to an additional ton of GHG emitted at a given point in time, allowing for its natural decay rate. 
A third aspect of climate damage assessment relates to the modelling approach adopted to include 
the damage function into an economic impact assessment model. Among the applied methods used to 
analyse the economic impact of climate damages on economic system, Integrated Assessment Models 
(IAM) combine economic and climatic module based on a damage function. In the DICE and RICE models 
by Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013) climate damages are a quadratic function of the global mean 
temperature change,4 while the MERGE Model for Estimating the Regional and Global Effects of GHG 
reductions (Manne et al., 1995; Manne and Richels, 2005) follows the WTA approach. In the WITCH 
(World Induced Technical Change Hybrid) model (Bosetti et al., 2006b; De Cian et al., 2012) costs 
                                                 
3 The Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) is an international cooperation group founded in 2009 by the Maldives, that now 
includes 20 countries that face significant insecurity due to climate change. 
4 DICE (RICE) is the (regional) Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy model. 
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associated to market components are expressed as percentage change of the regional GDP, while for 
non-market impacts (health, ecosystem and catastrophes losses) the WTA approach is followed.5 
Due to their high level of aggregation and long time horizon, these models have also been combined 
with a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) framework (resulting in a hybrid approach) to better 
account for inter-sectoral linkages. Based on a production function approach, climate impacts can be 
linked to different drivers of economic growth in a CGE framework and expressed as percentage of GDP 
(OECD, 2015).6 The evaluation of the effects of climate on GDP depends on the impact under scrutiny. 
For the agriculture sector for example, the cost is expressed in terms of land and crop productivity 
change (Bosello et al., 2012a; Ciscar et al., 2014). As an example of non-market aspects, health damages 
are often introduced into the production function as changes in labour productivity (Bosello et. al., 
2009). Energy impacts are generally investigated by considering changes in energy demand for cooling 
and heating (Ciscar et el, 2014; OECD, 2015), while land loss due to sea level rise is the main measure of 
impacts in coastal zones (Bosello et al., 2012b; Darwin and Tol, 2001).7 
A fourth aspect refers to how monetary damages affect GDP in such models. In particular, including 
the climate cost components with respect to only the direct impacts implies describing the costs of 
climate change as a percentage of GDP without taking into account other dynamic effects. When 
introducing the damage in a recursive way, the multiplicative effects due to economic interactions 
(indirect impacts) are also captured (Bosello et al., 2012a), with a wider effect on GDP due to sectoral 
and international adjustments (Eboli et al., 2010). 
 
3. The GDynEP model with climatic damage 
In order to evaluate the economic impacts of mitigation actions and climatic damage jointly, we use a 
                                                 
5 These impacts are derived from specific applied models. In particular, the impact on coastal land loss due to the sea level rise 
is driven by results from the DIVA (Dynamic Integrated Vulnerability Assessment) model (Vafeidis et al., 2008). The 
ClimateCrop model (Iglesias et al. 2009, 2010) is used for changes in the average productivity of crops in agriculture sector, 
while data on for the energy sector, as the changes in residential energy demand due to increasing temperatures, are derived 
from the POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems) model (Criqui, 2001; Criqui et al., 2009). 
6 An example is the CIRCLE project “Costs of Inaction and Resource Scarcity: Consequences for Long-term Economic Growth 
Project”, where the dynamic general equilibrium ENV-linkages model is used to express climate impacts in monetary term and 
links them to GDP. In this case, the impacts covered are: loss of land and capital due to sea level rise, capital damages from 
hurricanes, changes in crop yields, fisheries catches, labour productivity, tourism flows, health care expenditures due to 
diseases and heat stress and energy demand for cooling and heating. 
7 For an extensive review on sectoral impacts see Markandya et al. (2017). 
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dynamic CGE model (GDynEP) based on the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) structure enriched by 
a climatic exogenous module.  GDynEP is a combination of different GTAP model versions and databases 
with a novel module that allows the cost of climatic damage to be included. The appeal of a CGE approach 
is the inclusion of detailed market interactions between sectors and countries that represent global 
economic mechanisms. There are different modelling approaches that could be adopted for such a policy 
evaluation exercise, as described in the previous Section. If the quantitative assessment is built for policy 
optimization, the modelling choice is likely to be an IAM such as the DICE/RICE. While IAMs have the 
advantage of directly including environmental science modules, the economic systems are less detailed. 
In GDynEP we take the GHG concentration and the emission path as exogenously provided by available 
physical models and interact it with economic mechanisms via a monetary damage function. This choice 
is driven by the fact that in this analysis we are not interested in finding an optimizing environmental 
policy, but rather in exploring the influence of alternative climatic damage estimations through the set 
of detailed inter-sectoral and international economic relationships on economic output and thereby on 
bargaining position of countries in the climate regime. 
In the standard GTAP model versions there is only a stylized environmental mechanism that does 
not include the full range of factors that influence economic growth in the face of climatic shocks. These 
versions only look emissions produced by anthropogenic production and consumption activities. 
Consequently, our original contribution is to enrich the standard GTAP dynamic CGE model with a 
specific module that accounts for the economic impact of damage. 
 
3.1 Model details 
In order to obtain a GTAP-type model that includes both GHG emissions and a complete representation 
of the energy system the first step is to merge the GDynE (the energy version of the dynamic GDyn) 
developed by Golub (2013) and improved by Markandya et al. (2015) with the GTAP-Power database 
(Peters, 2016), which introduces for the first time in GTAP a detailed representation of the renewable 
electricity sector. The representation of the energy sector with distinguished fossil and non-fossil 
sources allows a better calibration of the scenarios for the sectors and countries responsible for GHG 
emissions, in terms of relative costs of reaching the mitigation target given the technical possibilities 
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available for energy production.8 
The second step is to introduce monetary damage due to climate change in the economic structure. 
We assume a damage function linked to GHG concentrations at the global level according to the SCC 
approach. By taking a global damage measure, it is possible to cover all cost types related to climatic 
damage, including non-market costs that are usually underestimated by those modelling approaches 
that compute climatic damage costs only directly related to impacts on productivity. We consider that 
the SCC reduces the global wealth according to a weak sustainability approach, following the 
methodological assumptions of the Genuine Savings (GS) calculation by the World Bank (Hamilton and 
Clemens, 1999) where the monetary value of climatic damage is a negative element of the savings 
function. The adoption of a weak sustainability criterion allows all forms of capital to be considered as 
perfectly substitutable (Hartwick, 1977, 1978; Solow, 1986). This in turn implies that the cost of damage 
is a negative component of the capital accumulation function, a component that could be compensated 
by additional savings from production activities or additional investments in human or technological 
capital formation (including investments in adaptation). 
Translating these assumptions into model functions can be synthesized as follows. 
We first consider the widest computation of global damage due to climate change as the most 
appropriate one to calculate the SCC. To the best of our knowledge the most comprehensive available 
measure of damage costs provoked by climate change is provided by DARA. 
Since damage costs are available only till 2012, the evolution over time is shaped according to the 
SCC approach. From the global costs at 2011 (which is the starting point of the GTAP database) we 
                                                 
8 The included electricity generating technologies are Coal, Gas, Oil, Hydro, Wind, Solar, Nuclear and Other Base Load Power 
sources, while Gas, Oil, Hydro and Solar generating technologies are further divided between Base and Peak Load. All details 
on the aggregation choice for this GDynEP model version are reported in Appendix A. In order to merge GDynE and GTAP-
Power, it is worth mentioning that in this model version we have adopted two simplifying assumptions. First, the transmission 
and distribution sector for electricity is included in the service sector and it is not taken as a distinguished one. This implies 
that there is no technical difference between renewables and the other energy sources in the transmission of electricity. This 
conservative assumption is adopted because we have no region-based data on distinguished institutional and technical features 
for the electricity transmission and distribution. Second, given that GDynEP is not a bottom up technical model, it deserves 
specific exogenous behavioral parameters for each stage of the production function. By introducing the renewable electricity 
sector, it is necessary to add a specific substitution elasticity parameter between fossil-based and renewable electricity. Given 
that there is not a specific value provided in the GTAP database, we have derived it from calibrating the BAU scenario in order 
to have a dynamic trend in renewable electricity production up to 2050 in line with BAU provided by IEA Outlook (IEA, 2015). 
We acknowledge that this is an extremely conservative hypothesis, especially when carbon mitigation scenarios are 
considered. Nonetheless, in this paper we test only the emission trading policy option without exploring the role of public 
support to clean technologies, and this allows taking this substitution parameter as constant. Future research lines would 
require specific efforts in empirically estimating substitution elasticities at least at the country level as well shaping the 
evolution of such parameter over time. 
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compute the initial SCC as an average cost for each ton of GHG concentrations in 2011. The projection of 
GHG concentrations allows the evolution over time of the SCC to be estimated, according to the specific 
emissions scenario under scrutiny. 
Formally, the initial global average SCC (𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡0) is given by the ratio between the total monetary value 
of losses due to climatic damage (𝐶𝐶𝐺𝑡0) calculated on DARA data at the world level and the stock of 
CO2-eq in the atmosphere (𝑆𝐶𝑂2𝑡0) as: 
                                                   𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡0 =  
𝐶𝐶𝐺 𝑡0
𝑆𝐶𝑂2𝑡0
                                                                            (1) 
The atmospheric concentration enters the model as an exogenous variable with values provided by 
NOAA historical data.9 Starting from DARA and NOAA data, the value of 𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡0 in 2011 is USD 195 per Gt 
of CO2-eq. 
Future projections on CO2-eq concentration are taken from IPCC, as a simple mean between results 
obtained from different models applied to the IPCC RCP8.5 Reference Scenario (IPCC, 2014) and 
converted from PPM to CO2 emissions according to the IPCC conversion factor.10 The stock of CO2-eq at 
time t (𝑆𝐶𝑂2𝑡) is determined as: 
    𝑆𝐶𝑂2𝑡 = 𝑆𝐶𝑂2𝑡−1 ∙ (1 − 𝑑) + 𝐶𝑂2𝑡                                                          (2) 
Where 𝐶𝑂2𝑡 is the emission flow at time t and d the annual decay rate of CO2-eq in the atmosphere. The 
projected concentration in the baseline in 2050 is about 630 PPM and the corresponding temperature 
increase is about 3°C (in a range from 2.6°C to 4.8°C relative to the period 1986–2005 as in RCP8.5 
Reference Scenario in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report). 
The evolution of the SCC over time is calculated according to a simple function that considers average 
damages from climate change as a function of additional tons of GHG net of natural decay rate:11 
                                𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡 = 𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡−1 + (𝑆𝐶𝑂2𝑡 − 𝑆𝐶𝑂2𝑡−1)
𝛼                                                (3) 
Eq. (3) allows different evolution paths to be considered over time given a specific GHG concentration 
                                                 
9 NOAA estimates the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere at 404.06 PPM in 2011. 
10 The stock of GHG concentrated in the atmosphere used for the calculation of the average damage cost is taken from the PPM 
concentration measure available from IPCC (2014) and expressed in ton of CO2-eq by applying the conversion criteria used by 
IPCC: 1 PPM CO2 = 2.12 Gton Carbon; 1 ton Carbon = 3.66 ton CO2; 1 PPM of CO2 rise in the atmosphere is equal to 2.12*3.66 
Gton CO2 emission. 
11 For a comparison of alternative damage functions used in other IAM and CGE models, see Markandya et al. (2017). 
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according to the value assumed by parameter α. Given the purpose of this paper, we are not interested 
in providing an evaluation of climatic damage per se, but at considering how differently shaped profiles 
of SCC would influence the bargaining position of countries. Accordingly, a flexible way to include SCC 
in the economic system is required and this is possible by assigning different values to parameter α. 
According to eq. (1), the evolution over time of the total cost of climatic damage at the global level (that 
corresponds to the total economic losses) is given by: 
                                                  𝐶𝐶𝐺𝑡 =  𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝐶𝑂2𝑡                                                                      (4) 
Given the uncertainties about climate change impact and the exogenous nature of the climatic module 
in GDynEP, rather than pre-determining alternative damage functions, we test different trends for the 
costs by using alternative values for the parameter α. The total cost of climate change is calibrated with 
different levels of global GDP loss provided by models that include different types of cost. This procedure 
roughly corresponds to accounting for the influence of uncertainty on the level of damages for a given 
level of warming (Crost and Traeger, 2014). We investigate four different cost patterns by assigning four 
different values to α, associated with the same level of projected GHG concentration in 2050 (about 630 
PPM corresponding to a temperature increase in a range from 2.6°C to 4.8°C relative to the period 1986–
2005, in line with projections by the RCP8.5 scenario in IPCC Fifth Assessment Report). The first value 
(α=0.3) describes a cost path aligned with ENVLINK model by OECD (2015) with a 2% global GDP loss 
by 2050 for a temperature increase of 3°C where only market-based costs influencing the production 
function are included. Then we examine two intermediate levels: a 3% GDP loss (α=0.653) obtained as 
the average loss taken from recent studies that model recursively the global cost of climate change 
associated with the aforementioned temperature increase range (AD-RICE, DICE, ENVISAGE, ENVLINK, 
PAGE); and a second level that corresponds to a loss of global GDP equal to 4% in 2050 (α=0.761). The 
upper bound is represented by a 5% GDP loss that roughly reproduces the projection up to 2050 of the 
DARA estimates (available till 2030) representing the widest costs range (α=0.817). 
The regionalization of the global cost over time is modelled by assigning the cost in accordance with 
the vulnerability of each region to climate change. While the initial regional costs is equivalent to those 
provided by DARA at 2011, the evolution over time is directly linked to the dynamics of a regional net 
vulnerability measure (𝑁𝑉𝑟,𝑡) represented by the ratio between the Vulnerability Index (𝑉𝑟) and the 
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Readiness Index (𝑅𝑟) developed by Chen et al. (2015) for the calculation of the Notre Dame Global 
Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN). This is in line with the definition of environmental disaster as previously 
mentioned, since the climate disease turns into losses proportionally to the vulnerability of a community 
and to the population exposed. 
The great advantage of the ND-GAIN with respect to other vulnerability assessment is that it 
synthesized a wide range of information in a single measure that is available for a comprehensive 
number of countries.12 As the values available for the vulnerability and adaptation capacity at the 
country level refer to the current situation, the dynamics of the index are proxied by the population 
trends, that allow consideration of changes in population exposed to climate damages given a certain 
net vulnerability. Algebraically we have: 















                                                        (5)  
Where the dynamics of the net vulnerability of a region depend on the relative population share of each 
region with respect to the world (i.e. 𝑃𝑟,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑔,𝑡 the regional and global population, respectively).13 
The distribution of the global cost among regions (𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑟,𝑡) is given by:14 
                       𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑟,𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝑡 ∙  𝑁𝑉𝑟,𝑡                                                                            (6)  
The regional distribution of the global cost calculated starting from a damage function built on the 
SCC concept corresponds to an empirical computation of what Kotchen (2018) defines as the Domestic 
SCC (DSCC). DSCC measures the marginal damages to each country arising from an increase in 
emissions. The measure of 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑟,𝑡 corresponds to the total damage to each country given the increase in 
                                                 
12 The Vulnerability Index measures a country’s exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (components) to the negative 
effects of climate change. It considers six life-supporting sectors: food, water, health, ecosystem service, human habitat, and 
infrastructure. 36 indicators (two per component in each sector) contribute to the measure of vulnerability, obtained as a 
simple mean of the sector scores, which are the average scores of component indicators. Readiness measures the ability of a 
country’s private and public sectors to absorb investment resources and successfully apply them to reduce climate change 
vulnerability. Readiness includes indicators for three components (social, economic and governance indicators) not weighted 
equally (Economic Readiness is 50% of the readiness score while governance and social readiness are 25%). 
13 The ratio between the vulnerability and readiness indices has been normalized (min = 0; max = 2) and then it is kept constant 
over time, as there is not information about future projections, especially because of uncertainties with regard to readiness 
issues. Thus, the variation in the regional distribution of damage cost is due to variations in population dynamics data. 
Population data do not take into account deaths caused by climate change since the vulnerability measure provided by ND-
GAIN already includes number of deaths. In particular, the health component captures a country’s vulnerability of public health 
to climate change, including projected change of deaths from climate change induced diseases. 
14 Although Farmer et al. (2015) emphasize the role of uncertainty in shaping the cost of climate change into IAMs, for the sake 
of simplicity in this work we ignore this factor that will be part of future work. By considering country vulnerability to climate 
change fixed over time in physical term, our modelling choice underestimates future damages that could be larger if 
vulnerability raises with increasing temperatures. 
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GHG concentration over a specific period. The increase in concentration means an emission flow that 
multiplied by the marginal DCC provides a total regional cost. 
The regional cost enters the economic system following the approach of an adjusted Net National 
Product (NNP) developed in Weitzman (1976) that can serve as an indicator of welfare and measure 
what can be consumed today without reducing future consumption possibilities. Starting from the 
standard net savings function in System of National Accounts (SNAs), as represented by the sum of the 
difference between the production (Y) and consumption (C) measures of each i-th agent in each region 
r at time t: 
                            𝑆𝑟,𝑡 = ∑(𝑌𝑖,𝑟,𝑡−𝐶𝑖,𝑟,𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                             (7)  
by assuming that all savings are invested (𝑆𝑟,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑟,𝑡), we can express the capital stock function as the 
sum of the capital stock available in the previous period net of the depreciation rate (𝛽) and the total 
investments (I) net of the regional cost of climate change:15 
                            𝐾𝑟,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑟,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛽)𝐾𝑟,𝑡−1 −  𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑟,𝑡                                                             (8)  
The output (Y) produced each period is a function of the endowments available over time (here 
represented by capital stock, K, human capital, L, and natural resources, R) as follows: 
                            𝑌𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐾𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 , 𝐿𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 , 𝑅𝑖,𝑟,𝑡)                                                                             (9)  
By assuming a weak sustainability criterion we also adopt a full substitutability between all forms of 
capital (economic, human, natural) in contributing at the formation of the output. Accordingly, the 
reduction in total capital stock due to environmental damage (or over depletion of natural capital) can 
be assigned indifferently to whatever form of capital (physical, human or natural), since the different 
components of the overall capital stock are fully replaceable by investments in whatever capital type. 
                                                 
15 Eq. (8) provides a stylized description of how damage cost is considered into the capital stock function of GDynEP. More 
precisely, GDynEP adopts the same capital accumulation function structure of GDyn (Ianchovichina and McDougall, 2000) in 
which international capital mobility is allowed. Accordingly, the cost of climate change can be considered as a negative 
component of the available net investments at the regional level (that derive from national and foreign savings). To this 
purpose, the adoption of a weak sustainability approach allows including all forms of capital (economic, natural and ecologic) 
into a unique total capital stock measures assuming full substitutability of different forms of capital (Hamilton, 1996; 
Neumayer, 2003). This allows treating the damage cost as a negative component of capital accumulation whatever form of 
capital is considered. Given that in GDynEP, economic capital (𝐾𝑟,𝑡) is the only form of capital that is dynamically modelled and 
changes over time according to market mechanisms, we have modelled the cost of climatic damage within the economic capital 
accumulation function. 
14 
Finally, by introducing the cost of climate change into the capital stock function as in eq. (8), and 
considering the relative use of capital as an input of the production function of each i-th agent as in eq. 
(9), the economic impact of climatic damage is distributed across agents according to their technical 
production coefficients and their capital intensity. Given that GDP is a monetary measure of the market 
value of all final goods and services produced in a period, according to eq. (9) the GDP is affected each 
period by the reduction in production capacity of each agent according to the negative impact on capital 
stock availability. 
 
3.2 Country and sector coverage and scenarios 
This GDynEP version is aggregated into 19 regions and 22 sectors. Regions are formed following the 
Kyoto Protocol scheme with Annex I and non-Annex I countries. The first group includes the European 
Union, United States, Russian Federation, Rest of Europe, Rest of OECD East and Rest of OECD West. 
Within the second group, we distinguish: i) single countries (emerging economies with strong 
bargaining positions in the negotiations and eligible to emission cut commitments, as Brazil, China, 
India), ii) three groups (one per geographic area) of energy exporting countries (African Energy 
Exporters, American Energy Exporters, Asian Energy Exporters) and iii) all the remaining developing 
countries without an energy-based economy further distinguished according to their geographical 
location (Western Africa, East and South Africa, American Energy Exporters, South America, Central 
America and Caribbean, Continental Asia, Rest of South Asia, South East Asia).16 
We differentiate 22 industries, with the aim of maintaining a deep disaggregation for energy 
intensive industries and energy producers: agriculture; food, beverages and tobacco; textile; wood; pulp 
and paper; chemical and petrochemical; non-metallic minerals; iron and steel; other metals ; machinery 
equipment; transport equipment; other manufacturing industries; transport; water transport; air 
transport and services, while energy commodities have been disaggregated in coal, oil, gas, oil products, 
electricity from fossil and nuclear sources, electricity from renewable sources.17 
                                                 
16 Asian developing and emerging countries have also been distinguished in Rest of South Asia and South East Asian 
representing, respectively, developing and emerging countries according to their level of development. 
17 See Table A.2- A.5 in Appendix A for a detailed description of regional and sectoral aggregates. 
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The GTAP-Database (GTAP-Database 9.1, updated to 2011) is used for the starting period, and the 
temporal structure is a first 4-year period up to 2015, followed by seven 5-year periods up to 2050. 
The Business as Usual (BAU) scenario corresponds to CO2-eq emission projections provided by IPCC 
(2014) and distributed across regions according to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2015) World 
Economic Outlook. It embodies the effects of only those government policies and measures that had 
been adopted by mid-2015 and considers the feasible technical change for each region. 
BAU is based on projections for macro variables as GDP, population and labor force given by the 
combination of several sources. In particular, GDP projections are the simple average values of four 
sources: the OECD Long Run Economic Outlook, the GTAP Macro projections, the IIASA projections used 
for the OECD EnvLink model, and the CEPII macroeconomic projections used in the GINFORS model. 
Population projections are taken from the UN Statistics (UNDESA) while projections for the labour force 
(modelled as skilled and unskilled separately) are taken by comparing labour force projections provided 
by ILO (which result as aggregate) with those provided by the GTAP Macro projections (where skilled 
and unskilled labour force are disentangled). In order to calibrate emissions in BAU according to IEA 
projections, in GDynEP emissions are exogenously shocked while the endogenous variable adjusting 
over time is technical change at the regional level. 
The burden sharing in the mitigation policy scenario is consistent with IEA (2015), given by a 
regional emission path that limits the global increase in temperature to around 2°C, limiting the GHG 
concentration in atmosphere at 450 PPM, based on the technological capabilities of regions.18 
The policy instrument to achieve the target is required to meet the following criteria. First, it must 
be one that ceteris paribus allows overall mitigation costs to be minimized, since we are interested in 
assessing how such costs could be compensated by potential benefits from damage reduction. By 
adopting a benefit-cost analysis approach, the assessment of a climate policy linked to different 
evaluation criteria for climatic damage should be carried by comparing the benefits with a common 
benchmark. We adopt as a benchmark the lowest possible mitigation cost that corresponds to the choice 
                                                 
18 We acknowledge that the burden sharing adopted for the policy scenario is compatible with technological capabilities of 
regions but is not chosen on the basis of real policy feasibility (for instance strongly affected by the U.S. defection). The exclusion 
of the U.S. from mitigation actions would force to recalculate the burden sharing for all the other regions if the final goal is to 
reach anyway a 450 PPM concentration. This modelling choice will reduce comparability across scenarios selected for this 
specific paper. Further work could be done in the future to evaluate the effect of alternative burden sharing options. 
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of a social planner who would like to maximize the likelihood of an international climate agreement 
being signed and implemented. 
Second, it is necessary to assume that all countries have an emission reduction path, in order to have 
a measure of the cost of participating at a collective action for each country (if one country has no target, 
by definition it also has no mitigation costs). 
These features lead to a policy instrument based on a global emission trading (GET) system that 
meets the cost effectiveness criterion and involves all regions. In operational terms, each country has a 
specific mitigation target that is derived by the IEA (2015) on the basis of technical feasibility evaluation, 
and it imposes a carbon tax to reach the target. Given the possibility to trade permits across regions 
without any cap or limitation, each agent decides to buy or sell permits on the basis of the relative 
convenience of the carbon price with respect to its own marginal abatement cost. The market clearing 
condition allows all marginal costs to be equal to the unique carbon price on the global permits market. 
To sum up, four scenario settings are shaped: 
1. Business As Usual without considering the cost of climatic damage (BAU NO COST) 
2. Global Emission Trading without considering the cost of climatic damage (GET NO COST) 
3. Business As Usual including the cost of climatic damage (BAU COST) 
4. Global Emission Trading including the cost of climatic damage (GET COST) 
Settings #3-4 have been run according to the four cost patterns previously described, thus resulting 
in 8 scenarios. 
 
4. Results 
The damage patterns associated with emissions (and relative concentration paths) in BAU and GET 
scenarios are compared in Figure 1 to visualize the incidence of alternative values of the parameter α 
on climate cost path. The large difference between GHG concentrations over time in BAU vs. GET 
scenario explains the huge difference in damage profiles given the same damage function as given in eq. 
(3). Different values assigned to parameter α determine different damage paths given the same GHG 
concentration, while different emission paths influence GHG concentrations and consequently we see 
different damage profiles given the same value for the parameter α. 
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Figure 1 – Damage costs in BAU and GET scenarios (constant 2015 Bln USD) 
 
 
By modelling damage costs in a dynamic framework shows the large discrepancy in GDP growth 
patterns when both direct and indirect impacts are considered. When comparing the two scenarios with 
the minimum and the maximum losses, it is worth mentioning that damage cost reduces GDP more than 
proportionally with respect to the monetary level of climatic damage, with an increasing negative impact 
associated with the wider range of losses included (Figure 2). The percentage reduction in GDP in the 
case of the direct impact is obtained by the ratio between the value of 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑟,𝑡 and the GDP level in BAU 
NO COST scenario, where GDP projections do not account for the reduction in capital formation due to 
damage cost. As a general remark, when comparing the damage costs in BAU vs. GET, the decline in 
damage associated to different GHG concentration patterns increases more than proportionally with the 
parameter α. This result could have implications for risk averse policy makers who are particularly 
concerned about pessimistic scenarios. According to Valentina and Vitale (2018), in the case of a policy 
maker with a high level of risk-aversion, the potential damage associated to a high value of the 
parameter α could justify the early adoption of aggressive mitigation policies.19 
This result reveals that together with the necessity to converge to an international consensus on the 
                                                 
19 In this paper we have not modeled the relation between the value adopted for parameter α and the level of risk-aversion of 
the social planner since we consider a common and univocal mitigation path that is driven by the IPCC and IEA bottom up 
climate-energy models. In the case of mitigation efforts endogenously decided according to the risk aversion of the policy 
maker, the value for parameter α would also influence timing profiles for mitigation actions. We will develop this relation in 
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methodology to compute economic losses due to climate change, it is also necessary to reflect on the 
evaluation method for GDP impact assessment. This is strongly recommended in light of how the 
regional distribution of GDP change due to damage is affected by the specific cost pattern under scrutiny. 
 
Figure 2 – Direct and indirect impact of damage cost as % of GDP in BAU 
 
 
By considering the impact in 2050 (Table 1), China and developed countries are those that suffer the 
least from climate change whatever damage cost specification is considered. On the contrary, India 
registers low losses in the case when global costs are 2% and α=0.3, but when shifting toward the 
inclusion of all market and non-market components (α=0.8), it turns out to be among the most affected 
by climate costs. Developing countries (DCs) are those which suffer the most, with a GDP loss that can 
reach over 16% if the widest range of impacts and cost estimates is considered. 
Among the DCs aggregate, Latin American countries register the lowest loss, while the costs to 
African countries are the highest. In fact, if we consider only market impacts (corresponding to the 2% 
GDP loss case), climate change causes a loss of GDP of about 7% for African countries, while they could 
face a 38% GDP loss in 2050 when the most inclusive damage function is adopted. 
Although the quantitative assessment of climatic damage is still uncertain and incomplete, these 
results confirm that some of the least developed of the developing countries will suffer the highest costs. 
Accordingly, an accurate computation of the cost of climate change and its introduction in the definition 
of a global agreement is essential. In addition, given that the heterogeneous distribution of economic 












be included in the negotiation agenda (and in policy evaluation exercises) should be the actions to 
increase accuracy in comparing relative vulnerability and adaptation capacity at the country level. 
 
Table 1 – GDP change in BAU COST w.r.t. BAU NO COST (in 2050) 
GDP Cost 2% Cost 3% Cost 4% Cost 5% 
World -2.0% -3.0% -4.0% -5.0% 
Developed -1.7% -2.3% -2.7% -3.1% 
DCs-Eex -3.3% -4.8% -6.2% -7.3% 
DCs -3.3% -6.7% -10.7% -16.2% 
DCs Africa -7.1% -14.6% -24.1% -38.7% 
DCs Asia -1.9% -4.0% -6.0% -7.7% 
DCs Latin America -1.0% -1.4% -1.8% -2.0% 
China -1.0% -1.5% -1.9% -2.2% 
India -1.7% -3.6% -5.5% -7.3% 
Row -2.3% -3.2% -4.0% -4.6% 
Note: acronyms for regions in GDynEP are DCs-developing countries, Eex-energy exporters, RoW-rest of the world. 
 
The GDP change due to climate policy with respect to BAU in 2050 reveals that potential gains from 
mitigation actions would exceed abatement costs for some regions but not for others (Table 2). The 
implementation of a GET scheme without considering climate damage would cost the world around 
5.2% of GDP by 2050. Emerging economies and energy exporters are those that lose the most, the former 
due to their stringent abatement commitment, the latter as a consequence of the decrease in the 
international demand for fossil fuels. Conversely, in DCs GDP losses are much lower thanks to their low 
abatement targets combined with an increase in competitive advantages on the international market 
with respect to those countries facing higher mitigation burdens. 
The introduction of the costs of climate change into policy assessment changes this picture 
substantially. The loss in global GDP declines to 2.8% in the 5% cost scenario, since lower emission flows 
due to mitigation actions smooth the increase in GHG concentration in atmosphere and, consequently, 
the cost of climatic damage is lower with respect to BAU over time (as in Figure 1). 
Not surprisingly, the highest benefits go to DCs, because they are relatively more vulnerable to 
climate change and do not base their economies on sectors affected by mitigation policies. In particular, 
African DCs see a shift in the trend of GDP in response to higher costs of climate change, thus creating 
also a benefit from the implementation of mitigation policies in terms of GDP change. 
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Table 2 – GDP change in GET w.r.t. BAU (in 2050) 
GDP No Cost Cost 2% Cost 3% Cost 4% Cost 5% 
World -5.2% -5.1% -4.5% -3.9% -2.8% 
Developed 3.5% 3.6% 3.9% 4.2% 4.6% 
DCs-Eex -15.6% -15.0% -14.3% -13.4% -12.3% 
DCs -2.4% -1.7% 0.6% 4.1% 11.3% 
DCs Africa 0.6% 1.7% 7.4% 18.0% 47.3% 
DCs Asia -11.5% -11.1% -9.9% -8.4% -6.5% 
DCs Latin America 6.1% 6.7% 7.0% 7.4% 7.7% 
China -16.2% -16.3% -16.2% -15.9% -15.6% 
India -17.3% -17.6% -16.5% -15.2% -13.5% 
Row -6.5% -6.3% -5.9% -5.7% -4.9% 
 
When considering the widest range of climatic impacts, it may occur that for poor countries the 
benefits associated with a reduction of climate costs exceed mitigation costs. If we look at the final cost 
in terms of GDP reduction in the BAU scenario when the climatic damage will impact at the highest level 
(5% for the whole world on average) African DCs will lose 38.7% of their GDP in 2050. In the case the 
Paris Agreement will be fully implemented and the emissions path will ensure an increase in 
temperature of a maximum of 2 degrees Celsius with a mitigation policy based on a global emission 
trading system, DC African countries will gain 47.3% in GDP terms with respect to the BAU scenario. By 
comparing this two results the net effect of a global mitigation action project are that African DCs turn 
out to about 8.6% better off in 2050 compared to a no action scenario. 
In order to better investigate how countries would benefit from the participation in a global climate 
agreement, we show in Figure 3 the overall GDP change due to mitigation policies calculated as the net 
present value (NPV) computed at 2015 for the whole period 2015-2050 at a discount rate equal to 3%. 
The computation of a NPV measure solves the accounting problem related to the temporal gap 
occurring between the implementation of mitigation actions with respect to the reduction in climatic 
damage. The fact that the benefits arising from a reduction in temperature increase will occur over a 
long-time horizon while high mitigation costs might be faced immediately could reduce the likelihood 
to cooperate, since the position of vulnerable countries would be divergent from that of polluting 
countries. By considering the discounted cumulative net cost-benefit result, it is possible to better 
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inform countries on their relative position and effective convenience in cooperating.20 
At the world level, whatever damage cost function is taken, the implementation of a GET scheme 
always entails a GDP loss at this discount rate. However, the negative GDP impact associated with the 
highest cost pattern is half the loss observed in the first scenario without damage cost (from a -2.1% 
GDP change to -1%). The role of damage costs is even more evident if we look at the differences in the 
regional distribution of GDP changes. Developed countries and Latin American DCs always benefit from 
mitigation actions in terms of GDP change. As for the African DCs, they face a small increase in their GDP 
in the first two scenarios, while they have a sharp increase associated with the participation in 
mitigation policies when the whole range of damage components are included (α=0.817), since the 
advantages coming from a reduction in climate change costs are much higher than the mitigation costs 
associated to their abatement actions. On the contrary, Asian DCs and energy exporters always lose 
when a global mitigation action is implemented whatever scenario is under scrutiny. 
 
Figure 3 – GDP % change in GET w.r.t. BAU (NPV in 2015) 
 
 
While for very vulnerable countries the introduction of the cost of climatic damage into the decision 
                                                 
20 In order to obtain accurate results, the discount rate should be both differentiated by region and declining over time 
(Philibert, 2003). However, in order to reduce uncertainty and facilitate the interpretability of results, we apply a single 
discount rate equal to 3%. This value is the most commonly used in SCC calculations and corresponds to the intermediate value 
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making process might persuade them to actively participate in mitigation actions, this is not true for 
emerging economies. In fact, whatever the damage function considered, they do not benefit from the 
implementation of mitigation actions, due to their high abatement commitments. China, in particular, is 
one of the countries facing the highest mitigation costs. It is worth noting that despite this, after a long 
negotiation process, China ratified the Paris Agreement. This represents a step forward towards an 
active participation of the main emitter country. However, the contents of the NDC submitted by China 
reflect the high mitigation costs for this country; while most countries set abatement objectives to be 
reached by 2030, China declares its intention to reach the peak of emissions around 2030, without 
establishing a real mitigation target.21 Furthermore, China also explicitly asks for international support 
and financing from the GCF, as a consequence of this high level of mitigation costs. 
From a consideration of the economic impacts associated to costs and benefits from mitigation 
actions, it emerges that it will be difficult to support a global climate policy since even if developing 
regions are better off, mitigation reduces the GDP at world level whatever value of the parameter α is 
adopted. This implies that regions which are better off from the implementation of a global climate 
policy cannot compensate regions which are worse off. This result holds in the case where the maximum 
impact in terms of GDP by 2050 of climate change would be around 5%, which is an estimate deriving 
from a damage function based on historical values provided by the DARA Report. The increasing 
scientific knowledge on the evolution of physical characteristics of climate change could modify 
expectations on the costs related to climate damage and provide higher values for the parameter α, 
potentially driving to a radical shift from a net loss to a net gain at the global level in GDP terms by 
implementing a GET policy.22 
Additionally, even though the current expectations on GDP impacts due to climate change are in the 
range of 2-5%, it is worth mentioning that if we adopt a welfare maximization perspective coherent with 
the SCC approach, the picture might radically change with alternative damage functions. Let us first 
graphically represent how the benefits and costs from mitigation actions interact in the GDynEP model 
                                                 
21 More specific targets are expressed in terms of use of renewable sources, afforestation and emission intensity. 
22 Further research work on this specific issue will be part of the next agenda on modelling climatic damage in GDynEP for 
assessing climate policy optimality under different uncertainty conditions. 
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in the case of the two cases of 2% and 5% damage. First, we consider the direct cost of climatic damage 
as provided by eq. (6) for scenarios with 630 PPM (BAU) and 450 PPM (GET), and in this second case 
the direct cost is represented by the residual damage after mitigation. Second, we compute the overall 
mitigation cost due to reaching the mitigation target (450 PPM scenario) via a GET policy, where the 
mitigation cost is given by the total value of domestic abatement costs at the regional level net of permits 
trading value (if the region is a net seller, revenue from permits are subtracted from abatement cost and 
vice versa). In this way it is possible to quantify only the direct impact on economic wealth related to 
climate mitigation and damage costs. We compare the overall costs faced in the GET Scenario (mitigation 
costs plus residual damage costs after mitigation) with damage costs faced in BAU. In Figure 4 we 
represent the case for a benefit-cost analysis where the cost of climate change will represent the 2% of 
GDP in 2050, while in Figure 5 we represent the 5% case. The area representing the net benefit from 
mitigation corresponds to the reduction in the cost provoked by climate change thanks to the mitigation 
action at the global level, here given by the area IJKM. The total cost of the mitigation policy is given by 
the sum of the abatement cost as represented by the area DLO (where the curve represents the marginal 
abatement cost and the total cost is given by the integral, the area under the curve) and the residual 
damage cost once the 450 PPM concentration is reached, given by the area DGJI. The net effect in benefit-
cost term is therefore the difference between the benefit IJKM and the total cost DLO+ DGJI. Given that 
the targeted concentration pattern of 450 PPM is obtained by reducing the same amount of GHG 
emissions whatever damage function is adopted, graphically speaking the area DLO representing the 
mitigation cost is the same in the two cases. What drives the net benefit-cost result is the different 
monetary value associated to the climatic damage. In the lower case the welfare impact is clearly 
negative while the opposite occurs in the highest damage cost case.23 
In order to complete the picture, we compare the overall costs faced in the GET Scenario (mitigation 
costs plus residual damage costs after mitigation) with damage costs faced in BAU in a NPV measure 
with a 3% discount rate at the regional level, according to the computation of the GDP effects. 
 
                                                 
23 We gratefully acknowledge Francesco Onufrio for inspiring us the combination of the different pictures of welfare aspects 
into a single graph as represented in Figures 4 and 5. 
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Figure 6 compares results for the lowest (Cost 2%) and the highest (Cost 5%) pattern, according to 
Figures 4 and 5. When the minimum damage cost function is taken into account, even though at the 
global level there is a net loss from the implementation of mitigation policies, DCs present a modest net 
gain. Moving to the highest cost pattern, a more comprehensive computation of climate costs may 
strengthen advantages in participating in mitigation also for countries facing a higher burden, as a 
consequence of their higher vulnerability to damage with respect to those regions facing a net loss. 
 
Figure 6 –Costs in GET w.r.t. BAU with the 2% and 5% cost pattern (Bln USD, NPV at 2015) 
 
 
Such differences in relative advantages from mitigation actions according to the economic measure 
under scrutiny (GDP change or welfare components) and the way damage is included in economy 
dynamics add evidence on the need to devote further research efforts in finalizing a common analytical 
framework on the internalization of damage costs into mitigation policy assessment. In the 2% case the 
global costs given by the sum of the mitigation and the residual damages are greater than the damage 
costs with BAU (the case of inaction). Henceforth, policy makers have a negligible risk that corresponds 
to the perception of low economic impacts related to climatic damage but it is a situation where it is 
impossible for all parties to gain from the action. In the 5% case the opposite is true, so it is possible to 
look for a solution where everyone gains. Since we do not know which is the right case, governments 
may be persuaded to work on a 5% (or higher) default value given their risk aversion at least 





























































































































































































































damages and social wellbeing is generated from the international scientific community. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Internalizing the cost of climatic damage into policy design in a systematic way is an important factor in 
influencing country behavior and bargaining strategies in global climate negotiations. Mitigation 
policies entail significant GDP losses especially for emerging economies and energy exporters even 
when the policy instrument respects the cost-effectiveness criterion. However, when the cost of climatic 
damage is considered, GDP losses decrease or they might become even gains, at least in selected regions. 
The heterogeneity of countries is reflected in their vulnerability to climate impacts combined with 
differences in mitigation burdens. These factors explain why the negotiating attitude and the 
attractiveness of mitigation are both affected by the internalization of damage costs. Accordingly, the 
vulnerability of a country to climatic damage and the real impact of damages in terms of economic losses 
should be two additional components of any attempt to define the magnitude of the threat and its 
burden sharing. 
The more exposed to climatic damage a country is, the higher its interest to act and to solicit actions 
from other parties in climate negotiations. This is also what emerges from the contents of NDCs 
submitted by developing countries, many of which set mitigation targets as a consequence of their high 
vulnerability to climate change. Given that future large emitters are the emerging economies, the main 
challenge for the forthcoming years is to persuade them to mitigate. In this respect, a precise evaluation 
of the cost of inaction might influence their bargaining behavior toward stronger efforts in mitigation 
activities. 
These results also provide an equity implication that deserves further attention in negotiations 
discourse. In the case of high damage costs, a cost-effective climate action such as a global trading 
emissions system might bring to a win-win solution with a reduction in global GHG emissions and an 
increase in GDP of less developed countries. Nonetheless, results from modelling exercises remain 
distant from reality given the numerous theoretical assumptions with respect to crucial issues such as 
the barriers to the adoption and diffusion of clean technologies in underdeveloped economies or the 
absence of constrains in transforming the decrease in GHG concentration due to mitigation policies into 
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a reduction in damage costs without any effective adaptation strategy. 
To this purpose, international assistance should be provided to developing countries to take effective 
action, not only in terms of financial support but also in terms of technology transfer and capacity 
building. All developing countries highlight this point in their NDCs, together with the crucial role that 
international cooperation and instruments such as the GCF can play in this context. The Paris Agreement 
has already acknowledged the need for cooperation and financial support to assist developing countries 
(Art. 6 and Art. 9), hence it is of high relevance to properly evaluate vulnerability and adaptation needs, 
losses and damages from climate change together with the role of sustainable development in reducing 
the risks (Art. 7 and Art. 8). More generally, climate negotiations should take into account the whole 
range of characteristics of each country in order to choose a development path that would include 
climate change impacts, including mitigation actions and potential vulnerability to damages. 
From our results three specific policy implications arise: i) there is an urgent need to develop a widely 
accepted methodology that provides a proper computation of the costs of climatic damage; ii) if inaction 
prevails in the coming years, the damage costs could enormously affect the GDP growth and would bring 
the world towards an unsustainable and unequitable development path; iii) together with measures to 
foster intra-generational equity, efficient compensating measures are required to facilitate the 
participation of those countries that, in spite of the reduction of climate economic damages, still face 
mitigation costs that are too high. In this respect, a key role can be played by the GCF, as highlighted in 
NDCs submitted by several developing and emerging countries, China included. Indeed, the perception 
of climatic damages together with national circumstances and priorities, influence bargaining positions 
expressed in NDCs, in terms of domestic efforts and international support. Accordingly, in addition to 
the establishment of better criteria and computation methods to evaluate climatic damages, there is also 
the need to define proper criteria for an equitable and effective resource allocation. 
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Table A.1 - DARA indicators 















Aggregation of sub-indexes 








• Heating and Cooling 
• Labour Productivity 
• Permafrost 







• Diarrheal Infections 
• Heat & Cold Illnesses 
• Hunger 























Source: DARA (2012), Methodological Documentation For The Climate Vulnerability Monitor 2nd Edition, p. 7 
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Table A.2 – ND-GAIN Vulnerability Indicators 
Sector Climate Risk Adaptive Capacity 
 Exposure Sensitivity  
Water 
Projected change in 
precipitation (High) 
Internal and external 
fresh water extracted for 
all uses (High) 
Population with access to 
improved water supply 
(Low) 
Projected change in 
temperature (High) 
Mortality among under 5 
yr.-olds due to water-
borne diseases (High) 
Population with access to 
improved sanitation (Low) 
Food 
Projected change in 
agricultural (cereal) 
yield (High) 




machinery and % land in 
irrigation) (Low) 
Coefficient of variation 
in cereal crop yields 
(High) 
Food import dependency 
(High) 
Children under 5 suffering 
from malnutrition (High) 
Health 
Estimated impact of 
future climate change 
on deaths from 
disease (High) 
Health workers per 
capita (Low) 
Longevity (Low) 





derived from external 
resources (High) 
Maternal mortality (High) 
Human Habitat 
Urban concentration 
in largest city (High) 
Urban population living 
in Slums (High) 
Value lost due to electrical 
outages (High) 
Urban Risk (High) Excess urban growth 
(High) 






Ecological Footprint  
(Low) 
Protected biomes (Low) 
Dependency on 







Land less than 10 m 
above sea-level (High) 
Population living less 
than 10mabove sea-level 
(High) 
Measured on the Readiness 
Axis 
Infrastructure (Energy) 
Population with access 
to reliable electricity 
(Low) 




Frequency of floods 
per unit area (High) 
Roads paved (Low) Measured on the Readiness 
Axis 
Source: University of Notre Dame (2013). Global Adaptation Index. Detailed Methodology Report 
Note: The marker “High” and “Low” refer to the direction of the relationship between each indicator and the overall 
vulnerability score. The indicator is marked “High” when the indicator contributes positively to vulnerability (i.e. 
high indicator value leads to high vulnerability score). The indicator is marked “Low” when it contributes 










Table A.3 – ND-GAIN Readiness Indicators 
Component Indicator 
Economic 
IEF24 Business freedom (High) 
IEF Trade freedom (High) 
IEF Fiscal Freedom (High) 
IEF Government Spending (Low) 
IEF Monetary Freedom (High) 
IEF Investment Freedom (High) 
IEF Financial Freedom (High) 
Governance 
WGI25 Voice & Accountability (High) 
WGI Political Stability & Non-Violence (High) 
WGI Control of Corruption (High) 
Social 
Tertiary Education (High) 
IEF Labor Freedom (High) 
Mobiles per 100 persons (High) 
WGI Rule of Law (High) 
Source: University of Notre Dame (2013). Global Adaptation Index. Detailed Methodology Report 
Note: The marker “High” and “Low” refer to the direction of the relationship between each indicator and the overall 
vulnerability score. The indicator is marked “High” when the indicator contributes positively to vulnerability (i.e. 
high indicator value leads to high vulnerability score). The indicator is marked “Low” when it contributes 
negatively to vulnerability (i.e., high indicator value leads to low vulnerability score). 
  
                                                 
24 Index of Economic Freedom 
25 Worldwide Governance Indicators 
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Table A.4 – List of GDYnEP Region aggregates 
 GDynEP code Description 
1 EU28 European Union 
2 USA United States 
3 ROECD1 Rest of OECD East 
4 ROECD2 Rest of OECD West 
5 BRA Brazil 
6 CHN China 
7 IND India 
8 RUS Russian Federation 
9 REU Rest of Europe 
10 AS1 Asian Energy Exporters  
11 AS2 Continental Asia  
12 AS3 Rest of South Asia 
13 AS4 South East Asia 
14 AF1 African Energy Exporters  
15 AF2 Western Africa 
16 AF3 East and South Africa 
17 LAM1 American Energy Exporters  
18 LAM2 South America 
19 LAM3 Central America and Caribbean Islands 
 
Table A.5 - List of GDYnEP Sector aggregates 
 GDynEP code Description 
1 coal Coal 
2 oil Oil 
3 gas Gas 
4 oil_pcts Petroleum, coal products 
5 ely_f Electricity from fossil and nuclear energy sources 
6 ely_rw Electricity from renewable energy sources 
7 agr Agriculture 
8 food Food 
9 textile Textile 
10 nometal Non-metallic mineral products 
11 wood Wood 
12 paper Pulp and paper 
13 chemical Chemical and petrochemical 
14 basicmet1 Basic metal 1 
15 basicmet2 Basic metal 2 
16 transeqp Transport equipment 
17 machinery Machinery and equipment 
18 oth_Manuf Other manufacturing industries 
19 transport Transport 
20 air_trans Water Transport 
21 water_trans Air Transport 





















EU28 aut Austria    REU xee 
Rest of Eastern 
Europe 
AF2 bfa Burkina Faso   
EU28 bel Belgium    REU xer Rest of Europe  AF2 cmr Cameroon    
EU28 cyp Cyprus    REU xsu Rest of Former Soviet AF2 civ Cote d'Ivoire   
EU28 cze Czech Republic   REU tur Turkey    AF2 gha Ghana    
EU28 dnk Denmark    REU xtw Rest of the World AF2 gin Guinea    
EU28 est Estonia    AS1 kaz Kazakhstan    AF2 sen Senegal    
EU28 fin Finland    AS1 bhr Bahrain    AF2 tgo Togo    
EU28 fra France    AS1 irn Iran Islamic Republic  AF2 xwf 
Rest of Western 
Africa 
EU28 deu Germany    AS1 kwt Kuwait    AF3 eth Ethiopia    
EU28 grc Greece    AS1 omn Oman    AF3 ken Kenya    
EU28 hun Hungary    AS1 qat Qatar    AF3 mdg Madagascar    
EU28 irl Ireland    AS1 sau Saudi Arabia   AF3 mwi Malawi    
EU28 ita Italy    AS1 are United Arab Emirates  AF3 mus Mauritius    
EU28 lva Latvia    AS2 mng Mongolia    AF3 moz Mozambique    
EU28 ltu Lithuania    AS2 npl Nepal    AF3 rwa Rwanda    
EU28 lux Luxembourg    AS2 pak Pakistan    AF3 tza Tanzania    
EU28 mlt Malta    AS2 kgz Kyrgyztan    AF3 uga Uganda    
EU28 nld Netherlands    AS2 arm Armenia    AF3 zmb Zambia    
EU28 pol Poland    AS2 aze Azerbaijan    AF3 zwe Zimbabwe    
EU28 prt Portugal    AS2 geo Georgia    AF3 bwa Botswana    
EU28 svk Slovakia    AS2 jor Jordan    AF3 nam Namibia    
EU28 svn Slovenia    AS2 xws Rest of Western Asia AF3 zaf South Africa   
EU28 esp Spain    AS3 xoc Rest of Oceania  AF3 xsc 
Rest of South 
African 
EU28 swe Sweden    AS3 xea Rest of East Asia LAM1 mex Mexico    
EU28 gbr 
United 
Kingdom   
AS3 brn Brunei Darussalam   LAM1 arg Argentina    
EU28 bgr Bulgaria    AS3 khm Cambodia    LAM1 ecu Ecuador    
EU28 hrv Croatia    AS3 lao 
Lao People's 
Democratic Republ 
LAM1 ven Venezuela    
EU28 rou Romania    AS3 phl Philippines    LAM2 bol Bolivia    
USA usa 
United States of 
America 
AS3 vnm Viet Nam   LAM2 chl Chile    
ROECD1 aus Australia    AS3 xse Rest of Southeast Asia LAM2 col Colombia    
ROECD1 nzl New Zealand   AS3 bgd Bangladesh    LAM2 pry Paraguay    
ROECD1 jpn Japan    AS3 lka Sri Lanka   LAM2 per Peru    
ROECD1 kor Korea    AS3 xsa Rest of South Asia LAM2 ury Uruguay    
ROECD2 can Canada    AS4 twn Taiwan    LAM2 xsm 
Rest of South 
America 
ROECD2 xna 
Rest of North 
America 
AS4 idn Indonesia    LAM3 cri Costa Rica   
ROECD2 che Switzerland    AS4 mys Malaysia    LAM3 gtm Guatemala    
ROECD2 nor Norway    AS4 sgp Singapore    LAM3 hnd Honduras    
ROECD2 xef Rest of EFTA  AS4 tha Thailand    LAM3 nic Nicaragua    
ROECD2 isr Israel    AF1 egy Egypt    LAM3 pan Panama    
BRA bra Brazil    AF1 mar Morocco    LAM3 slv El Salvador   
CHN chn China    AF1 tun Tunisia    LAM3 xca 
Rest of Central 
America 
CHN hkg Hong Kong   AF1 xnf Rest of North Africa LAM3 dom 
Dominican 
Republic   
IND ind India    AF1 nga Nigeria    LAM3 jam Jamaica    
RUS rus 
Russian 
Federation   
AF1 xcf Central Africa   LAM3 pri Puerto Rico   
REU alb Albania    AF1 xac South Central Africa  LAM3 tto 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  
REU blr Belarus    AF1 xec Rest of Eastern Africa LAM3 xcb Caribbean    
REU ukr Ukraine    AF2 ben Benin       
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agri pdr paddy rice      basicmet 1 i_s ferrous metals      
agri wht wheat       basicmet 1 nfm metals nec      
agri gro cereal grains nec     basicmet 2 fmp metal products      
agri v_f vegetables, fruit, nuts     transeqp mvh motor vehicles and parts    
agri osd oil seeds      transeqp otn transport equipment nec     
agri c_b sugar cane, sugar beet    macheqp ele electronic equipment      
agri pfb plant-based fibers      macheqp ome 
machinery and 
equipment nec    
agri ocr crops nec      oth_man_ind omf manufactures nec      
agri ctl 
bovine cattle, sheep and 
goats, horses  
services TnD 
transmission and 
distribution     
agri oap animal products nec     ely_f NuclearBL Nuclear power      
agri rmk raw milk      ely_f CoalBL Coal-fired power      
agri wol wool, silk-worm cocoons     ely_f GasBL 
Gas-fired power (base 
load)    
agri frs forestry       ely_rw WindBL Wind power      
agri fsh fishing       ely_rw HydroBL 
Hydroelectric power 
(base load)    
Coal  coa coal       ely_f OilBL 
Oil-fired power (base 
load)    
Oil   oil oil       ely_rw OtherBL Other power      
Gas   gas gas       ely_f GasP 
Gas-fired power (peak 
load)    
nometal omn minerals nec      ely_rw HydroP 
Hydroelectric power 
(peak load)    
food cmt 
bovine cattle, sheep and 
goat meat products 
ely_f OilP 
Oil-fired power (peak 
load)    
food omt meat products      ely_rw SolarP Solar power      
food vol vegetable oils and fats    gas gdt 
gas manufacture, 
distribution     
food mil dairy products      services wtr water       
food pcr processed rice      services cns construction       
food sgr sugar       services trd trade       
oth_man_ind ofd food products nec     transport otp transport nec      
food b_t 
beverages and tobacco 
products    
wat_transp wtp water transport      
textile tex textiles       air_transp atp air transport      
textile wap wearing apparel      services cmn communication       
textile lea leather products      services ofi financial services nec     
wood lum wood products      services isr insurance       
paper ppp 
paper products, 
publishing     
services obs business services nec     
oil_pcts p_c petroleum, coal products     services ros 
recreational and other 
services    
chem crp 
chemical, rubber, plastic 
products    
services osg 
public admin. and def., 
education, health  
nometal nmm mineral products nec     services dwe ownership of dwellings     
 
 1 
Manuscript Number EPOL-D-18-00012 
 
Reviewer#1 comments Detailed replies from authors 
Major issues  
1. It is stated in the abstract and the conclusions 
that the results of the model may change 
countries' bargaining strategies in climate 
negotiations. It is however not explained what 
negotiations are referred to and it is also not 
explained what bargaining positions are in this 
context and how they will be exactly changed by 
the results of the model. The paper should make 
these things explicit 
We thank the Reviewer for addressing this 
point. We have added some explanations for 
this purpose, both in the Introduction and in 
the Results Sections. In the Conclusions we 
have amended the text by including 
comments on this point and also to 
additional issues arisen by the Reviewers. 
2. The novelty in the modelling is the inclusion of 
climate damage in the CGE model. As I 
understand it, climate damage decreases the 
current capital stock (equation 8), which will 
(given unchanged investments?) also affect future 
capital stocks and hence the growth of the 
economy. This needs to be explained better. For 
one thing, the authors consider a capital stock 
that includes "all forms of capital (physical, 
human, natural)" but the GDyn model only 
includes physical capital as a factor of production. 
There may be something of a mis-match here. I 
would recommend that the authors explain in 
more detail how they understand the link 
between climate damage and capital loss and to 
provide some theoretical or empirical evidence 
that supports their modelling choice. 
We thank the Reviewer for this suggestion. 
We have provided more details in model 
description and we hope the text is clearer 
now. The crucial point is the adoption of the 
weak sustainability criterion. In GTAP 
natural resources and human capital are 
present as endowments (we are sorry for 
not specifying it in the previous version of 
the paper). The depletion of whatever form 
of capital can be assigned to the overall 
capital stock wherever the specific depletion 
occurs, according to the weak sustainability 
criterion. 
Minor issues  
3. A minor question is why the emission mitigation 
policy instrument "must be the policy choice that 
ceteris paribus allows overall mitigation costs to 
be minimized" (page 16). I simply do not 
understand this requirement 
We have better explained this point in the 
modelling description by referring to the 
benefit-cost analysis approach where the 
optimal climate policy is one that ensures 
the minimum mitigation cost with the 
maximum benefit. We thank the Reviewer 
for addressing this point, and we have 
better explained it in the text. 
 
Reviewer#2 comments Detailed replies from authors 
Major issues  
1. I would like to read something more on what the 
results suggest in terms of policy implication 
We thank the Reviewer for arising this issue. 
We have added discussion on policy 
implications in the Conclusions. 
2. Under this respect, the general message of this 
paper seems to be that climate costs matter as 
We thank the Reviewer for addressing this 
point. We have commented on the specific 
Author's Response to Reviewers' Comments Click here to download Author's Response to Reviewers'
Comments EPOL-D-18-00012-Reply to Reviewer_R1.docx
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they heavily affect GDP both in aggregate and at 
regional level. However, the results do not 
support a global climate policy since we observe 
that, even if some countries and regions are 
better off, mitigation reduces the GDP at world 
level for any value of the cost parameter. This 
implies that regions which are better off from 
participating in the global climate policy cannot 
compensate regions which are worse off. The 
difficulty of enforcing international agreements 
when compensations between winners and losers 
are unfeasible (because, in aggregate, some gain 
less than the others lose) represents an 
underestimated issue in this paper. In fact, I think 
that this issue may represent a limitation with 
respect to the claim of contributing to the debate 
on climate negotiations and the authors should 
put greater effort in dealing with it. On the other 
hand, this paper provides an interesting equity 
implication that probably deserves more 
discussion. Namely, it arises that a cost-effective 
climate action, such as a global trading emissions 
system, might be used as a development policy 
that allows to increase GDP of less developed 
countries, pursuing also environmental 
objectives. I do not know if this result is 
completely new in the literature, but I think it 
should be emphasized in any case. 
result related to GDP impact in the Results 
section and we have also tried to provide a 
better description of the link between this 
part of the analysis and the cost benefit 
analysis developed in the last part of the 
results description. 
With respect to the equity issue, we have 
expanded our comments in the Conclusions 
section, also according to suggestions from 
Reviewer #1. 
Minor issues  
3. I would suggest to look at Kotchen (2018) which 
is a recent theoretical paper that could be 
somehow related to your paper. 
We have considered the approach described 
in this contribution and linked with the 
interpretation of our results. 
4. In the first paragraph of Section 3 (p. 8) you refer 
to some “literature review” that I have not found 
in the paper. 
We have amended the text accordingly. 
5. When damage costs are evaluated under the GET 
scenario vis-à-vis the BAU scenario, it appears 
that the decline in damages from BAU to GET 
increases more than proportionally in the 
parameter α. This result could have implications 
for risk averse policy makers who worry about 
the worst scenarios. This is an issue that could 
probably deserve further investigation and 
comments. On this issue you could have a look at 
Valentini and Vitale (ERE, forth.) and the related 
literature cited in their paper. 
We really thank the Reviewer for addressing 
this point. We have better commented on 
this result also linking it with the suggested 
contribution. 
6. Check the fonts in Table 1 and Table 2. We have checked. 
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7. Your simulations show that China is one of the 
countries that would lose more in terms of GDP 
because of international climate policies. How do 
you explain this result in view of the current 
China's willingness to cooperate that emerged in 
the most recent COP agreement? 
We have added comments on this result also 
linking it with the recent efforts in NDCs 
after the Paris Agreement. 
 
